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Although there exists a vast literature on aid efficiency (the effect of aid on GDP), and that aid 
allocation  determinants  have  been  estimated,  little  is  known  about  the  minute  details  of  aid 
allocation.  This  article  investigates  empirically  a  claim  repeatedly  made  in  the  past  that  aid 
donors herd. Building upon a methodology applied to financial markets, this article finds that aid 
donors herd similarly to portfolio funds on financial markets.  It also estimates the causes of 
herding and finds that political transitions towards more autocratic regimes repel donors, but that 
transitions towards democracy have no effect. Finally, identified causes of herding explain little 
of its overall level, suggesting strategic motives play an important role. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
The  literature  in  economics  on  foreign  aid  has  so  far  mainly  concerned  itself  with  aid 
efficiency, attempting to answer the key question of whether aid indeed promotes growth. The 
motivation for this research agenda has been reinforced by the tough criticisms the aid industry 
has experienced over recent years. Among others, Paul Collier (2007), after a life devoted to 
development economics, in his recent book The Bottom Billion, argues that aid is unable to make 
a real difference to the world’s poor. Others, such as the former World Bank economist William 
Easterly, regularly point out the deficiencies in aid allocation mechanisms. For instance, Easterly 
and Pfutze (2008) argue that aid is fragmented between many small donors in a given country, 
increasing transaction costs and revealing coordination failures. 
 
After many papers evaluating the effect of aid on growth (see Roodman 2007 for a recent 
review of the literature) often reaching somewhat disappointing conclusions, some have started to 
narrow the question and look at the effect of aid on more specific variables (for instance Mishra 
and Newhouse 2007 on the effect of aid on infant mortality). Nevertheless, the question still 
remains firmly focused on the effect of aid on a given growth outcome. Much less has been said 
about the allocation of aid: while aid determinants have been estimated, donors’ decision process 
in their choice of recipients, or how one donor’s decisions may affect others’ allocations is still 
little understood. This is not a completely new concern. Cassen (1986) already mentioned that 
donors  moved  in  herds,  suddenly  disbursing  money  into  “star”  countries,  and  that  sudden 
increases were followed by long aid declines. However, while this claim has been made (Riddell 
2007 argues that there is a “herd instinct” among donors), no study has yet attempted to measure 
herding and to determine its causes.  
 
This paper is a first step in this direction. It is also part of a broader research agenda that 
studies donor allocation policies in order to understand the role of aid relative to capital flows. 
While herding is now a basic assumption among traders in bonds and equities, much less is 
known about aid donors. However if the latter also herd, might not such behaviour from both 
public and private actors compound to create even grater overall herding? Because aid donors are 
somehow  expected  to  play  a  different  role  to  that  of  private  investment,  we  believe  it  is  to 
compare these different actors’ actual behaviour.
1 
 
                                                 
1 For a comparison between aid donors and portfolio funds regarding quantities, volatility and fragmentation, see 
Frot and Santiso (2008).  3 
 
The concept of herding was originally developed by sociologists following the seminal work 
of French social scientist Gustave Le Bon, who published his famous La psychologie des foules 
in 1895 and some years later by George Simmel in another seminal book published in 1903, The 
Metropolis  and  Mental  Life.  The  very  first  economist  to  refer  to  this  notion  was  Thorstein 
Veblen; in his 1899 essay The Theory of the Leisure Class, written while at the University of 
Chicago, he explained economic behaviour in terms of social influences such as "emulation," 
where some members of a group mimic other members of higher status. The notion has grown to 
become  used  extensively  by  financial  economists  over  the  past  decades.  Bikhchandani  and 
Sharma (2000), or Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), provide overviews of the field. The academic 
study  of  behavioral  finance  has  identified  herding  as  an  important  factor  in  the  collective 
irrationality of investors, particularly the work of Robert Shiller (2000).  
 
This paper offers different measures of herding to test for its presence and evaluate its size. 
Our results all reject the hypothesis of no herding, with its importance depending on the chosen 
measure and sample. We develop two indexes and apply them to different data sets. The first one 
is the most widely used in the finance literature. It was proposed by Lakonishok et al. (1992) and 
has subsequently been broadly applied in the field. It is based on the simple intuition that there is 
herding when many more traders (donors) buy or sell a stock (increase or decrease aid to a 
recipient)  than  they  do  on  average.  The  variable  on  which  the  herding  measure  is  based  is 
therefore  the  proportion  of  traders  (donors)  buying  (increasing  aid  to)  each  stock-quarter 
(recipient-year). Frey et al. (2007) recently showed that this measure was negatively biased and 
did not consistently estimate herding even for large sample sizes. They proposed an alternative 
consistent measure based on the same intuition but relying on a simple structural model, which 
we also apply here. 
 
Nevertheless,  both  these  measures  are  used  in  this  paper  with  some  variations  from  the 
finance literature to capture the specificity of aid allocation. In particular we present results using 
two  types  of  data  frequency.  Yearly  data  is  available  for  aid  allocation,  but  is  likely  to  be 
contaminated  by  small,  “noisy”,  aid  movements  and  may  fail  to  capture  the  actual  donor 
allocation horizon. Longer time periods are therefore used to account for inertia in aid allocation 
and eliminate some noise. Our preferred measure uses 3-year data and suggests that herding size 
is around 10 per cent. This implies that in a world where 50 per cent of all allocation changes are 
increases, the average recipient experiences 60 per cent of its donors changing their allocation in 
the same direction. In other words half of recipients see 60 per cent of their donors increase their 
allocations, and the other half sees a 60 per cent decrease their aid allocations. Our lower bound 
for herding size, based on measures using yearly data, is around 6 per cent. 4 
 
 
Such a herding level may be difficult to interpret as many factors induce donors to change 
their aid allocations along similar lines, and so feed into herding measures. Herding determinants 
are therefore estimated to better understand what enters into our measures, and the effects of 
various  shocks  evaluated  using  appropriate  generalized  linear  model  (GLM)  techniques. 
Predictably,  we  find  that  transitions  towards  less  democratic  regimes  cause  donors  to 
simultaneously decrease aid allocations. However, the opposite does not reveal itself to be the 
case.  This  asymmetry,  while  somewhat  puzzling,  is  robust  to  all  our  specifications.  Natural 
disasters, unsurprisingly, also create herding, wars, however, do not. This estimation in itself may 
contribute to the debate on the determinants of aid, suggesting which factors trigger responses 
from donors, positive or negative. If we consider that donors first choose which recipients should 
receive more aid than in previous years and then, given a fixed aid budget, subsequently decide 
on precise allocation numbers then our results provide empirical estimates of the first step of the 
process.  
 
Finally, GLM estimates allow us to calculate the contribution of each determinant to the 
herding measure. Observable determinants in fact explain little of herding, with a very large share 
that cannot be solely attributed to political factors, natural disasters or wars. Though we must be 
careful in interpreting this result, these results suggest that other non-observable factors are at 
play, and in particular factors that relate directly to “pure” herding such as information cascades 
or signalling.  
 
Our motivations for studying herding are twofold. First, herding imposes costs and benefits 
on recipients. It can be regarded positively as the coordination of donors in cases of emergency. 
Humanitarian needs following a natural disaster or a war naturally call for a greater aid effort 
from donors. This paper attempts to avoid including such “beneficial” herding in its measures by 
carefully defining aid.  
 
On the other hand herding is  usually associated with  sudden swings  and an overflow of 
money that is not always beneficial.  In the case of aid, multiple donors implementing many 
missions  in  an uncoordinated fashion, or aid  fragmentation,  has  been shown to  decrease aid 
efficiency and may impose an unnecessary burden on already weak administrations in developing 
countries (see Djankov et al. 2008a; Djankov et al, 2008b; OECD, 2008; Knack and Rahman 
2007). By focusing on the proportion of donors increasing aid allocations, and not on actual aid 
quantities, we also hope to contribute to the debate on the causes of aid fragmentation. Cassen 
(1986) provides an example of herding leading to fragmentation and a misallocation of resources. 5 
 
He mentions that a large number of donors became involved in the Kenyan rural water supply 
sector, resulting in an overflow of administrative procedures that the weak Kenyan Ministry of 
Water Development could not face. Both donors and the Kenyan Government agree that aid to 
this sector has been a disaster.  
 
The costs of herding also include increased aid volatility. Herding may be an important factor 
behind the large swings in the levels of aid experienced by recipients, beyond the conscious 
coordination of aid decisions. Aid volatility has been a major concern for many years (see Bulíř 
and Hamann 2006) and its costs have been evaluated to be potentially very high for aid recipients 
(Arellano et al. 2008). While Frot and Santiso (2008) showed that other types of private capital 
inflows were more volatile, volatility in foreign aid flows is considered harmful for developing 
countries, and in particular in low income countries that are aid dependent (for an analysis of 
fiscal  and  budget  policy  sensitivities  on  aid  dependence,  see  Mejía  and  Renzio  2008).  An 
unstable source of finance prevents governments from planning ahead and, as shown by Agénor 
and Aizenman (2007), may bring aid recipients to fall into a poverty trap by making it impossible 
to invest in projects requiring a steady flow of funds. Bulíř and Hamann (2006) report that aid 
volatility has worsened in recent years. Kharas (2008) also finds the cost of volatility to be large 
and argues that herd behaviour, by creating donor darlings and orphans, accentuates collective 
volatility, underlining that while a donor can reduce volatility by running counter the overall aid 
cycle, the herding phenomenon will render this unlikely.   
 
A  second  motivation  of  the  paper  is  to  improve  our  understanding  of  donor  allocation 
policies.  It  has  been  argued  that  aid  depends  on  many  economic,  political  and  historical 
determinants. However, the interaction between members of the donor community has been little 
studied. Given the very large number of actors,
2 we expect decisions to depend on various signals 
(recipient needs, past relationship between donor and recipient, but also other donors’ decisions). 
While we are not the first to empirically investigate this link between donors, to our knowledge 
this paper is the first to use herding measures to document it. Past studies have estimated the 
effect of total donors’ aggregated aid on the aid of a specific, individual donor. 
Tezanos Vázquez (2008), using this methodology, finds a “bandwagon effect” of Spanish aid. 
Berthélemy (2006), Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) and Tarp et al. (1998) use exactly the same 
approach. It is however quite different from ours, in that it does not look at simultaneous identical 
decisions from donors and so does not have a great deal to say about interactions. It does not treat 
                                                 
2 53 donors reported their activities to the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD in 2007, but these do 
not include some other important donors (Brazil, China, Venezuela, etc.) and non-official donors (NGOs, private 
foundations and charities). 
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donors equally, as the total aid allocated to a recipient often depends on the decisions of a handful 
of large donors. Finally because of the reflection problem defined by Manski (1993) this effect is 
not consistently estimated using regressions.  
 
Finally, herding is potentially a force contributing to the emergence of donor darlings and aid 
orphans. Though her study is based on NGOs rather than on official donors, Reinhardt (2006) 
provides some evidence that donors do herd. She reports donor agents as saying that “we know 
other foundations trust Organization X, so we went straight there and told them we wanted a 
partnership”. An NGO financial director also acknowledges that “I can't get IDB money if I drop 
the ball with the World Bank”. When repeated this behaviour creates inequalities among aid 
recipients even if ex ante they share similar characteristics. Marysse et al. (2006) argue that 
political considerations and donor coordination problems have created such donor darlings and 
aid orphans in the region of the Great Lakes in Africa.  
 
II.  Beyond Fads and Fashions: Beneficial herding 
 
Any herding measure based on the detection of simultaneous and identical donor decisions 
must capture aid movements caused by exogenous factors. For instance when a natural disaster 
hits a country, there is  indeed herding.  When donors finance urgent humanitarian needs and 
decide simultaneously to increase their aid allocations to the country, we term this “beneficial” 
herding. It simply reflects suddenly increased needs that are taken into account by the donor 
community as a whole. The Asian Tsunami in December 2004 provides an excellent example of 
such beneficial herding.  
 Figure 1 plots the proportion of donors disbursing aid that actually increased their gross aid 
allocations  compared  to  the  year  before.  This  proportion  is  calculated  for  four  countries 









Figure 1: Proportion of donors increasing aid 
 
 
Source: Authors, 2009; based on OECD data, 2009. 
 
 
During the ten years preceding the tsunami the proportion of donors increasing their gross aid 
allocation hovers around 50 percent and remains relatively stable for each recipient, with perhaps 
the  exception  of  Sri  Lanka.  In  2005,  the  year  humanitarian  aid  was  actually  disbursed,  the 
proportion jumps to about 80 percent. In this case, coordinated donor actions are beneficial. It is 
herding  in  reaction  to  a  clear,  identifiable,  exogenous  shock.  Other  examples  are  available: 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Timor-Leste faced humanitarian crises and severe reconstruction needs 
that  triggered  simultaneous  aid  flows  from  most  donors.  More  recently,  in  2008,  Georgia 
received a USD 4.5 billion dollar aid pledge by 38 countries and 15 multilateral organisations. 
Donors also coordinate their actions when they grant debt relief. Many donors tremendously 
increased aid to Nigeria in 2005 and 2006, though this was through debt forgiveness mechanisms.  
 
Ideally a measure of herding would distinguish between such coordinated moves, sometimes 
decided in international summits, and herding caused by allocation policies, strategic motives, 
and competition among donors. A suitable definition of aid allows the elimination of a fair share 
of the former. Country Programmable Aid (CPA) does not include items that are not predictable 
by nature: humanitarian aid, debt relief and food aid. This variable has been used recently to 
study aid fragmentation (OECD 2008) and trends in foreign aid (Kharas 2007). It is calculated by 
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Development  Assistance  Committee  (DAC).  This  quantity  constitutes  the  core  of  aid  that 
finances  development  in  a  medium  to  long  term  perspective.  Though  not  perfect,  a  herding 
measure  based on this  variable is not  subject  to the sudden aid  swings  due to  humanitarian 
emergency and debt relief. 
 




Evaluating herding in aid allocation is  a thorny issue, leading us to turn to the financial 
literature where herding has been measured and modelled for many  years. Lakonishok et al. 
(1992) developed an index based on the idea that herding occurs when traders (donors) deviate 
from an “average” behaviour. Their methodology is purely statistical and does not rely on any 
structural model. It is therefore quite simple and general, but may not be powerful enough to 
detect and evaluate herding correctly. Their index LSVit is defined as follows 
 
𝐿𝑆?𝑖𝑡 =  𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡  − 𝐸 𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡  
 
On financial markets pit is the proportion of funds buying stock i in period t. By analogy 
in our aid study it is the proportion of donors increasing their allocation to recipient i in period t. 
The basic idea of the measure is that when there is no herding, aid increases and decreases are 
randomly  distributed.  If  there  are  an  excessive  number  of  increases  or  decreases  then  it  is 
interpreted as herding behaviour. πt provides the benchmark against which herding is assessed. It 
is the average proportion of aid increases in all the decisions taken in year t, 𝜋𝑡 =
  𝑏𝑖𝑡 𝑖
  𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑖
 where bit 
is the number of aid increases and nit is the number of donors active in recipient i in year t. It is 
the probability that a donor increases its aid to a recipient in year t under the hypothesis of no 
herding. The first term of the equation is positive even when there is no herding. The second term 
is an adjustment factor that serves as a correction. LSVit has therefore a zero expected value under 
the hypothesis of no herding. Herding is measured by averaging LSVit for the desired time period 
and  groups  of  recipients  and  we  denote  this  average  LSV.  This  measure  has  been  used  by 
Lakonishok  et  al.  (1992),  Grinblatt  et  al.  (1995),  and  Wermers  (1999),  amongst  others,  to 
estimate herding in mutual funds. Uchida and Nakagawa (2007) applied it to the Japanese loan 
market,  Weiner  (2006)  to  the  oil  market,  and  Welch  (2000)  to  financial  analysts.  Herding 
behaviour has been particularly pronounced in emerging markets as underlined by many studies 
on financial crisis spillovers (Ornelas and Alemani, 2008; Bekaert and Harvery, 2000). 9 
 
 
The key intuition behind LSVit is the dispersion of increases and decreases around the 
average proportion πt. This feature makes it neutral with respect to global trends in aid allocation. 
If donors cut their aid budgets, as they did in the nineties, this is captured by πt and it does not 
affect the herding measure. The overall increasing trend in aid over the last 50 years does not 
influence it either. LSVit is also independent of aid concentration at the recipient level. Whether a 
very  small  number  of  donors  represent  most  of  the  receipts,  or  whether  all  donors  disburse 
similar quantities to a recipient does not matter. Herding is here based on the idea of similar 
decisions, regardless of the quantities involved. For this reason it is also detached from fixed 
allocation determinants due to historical ties or political economy factors. For example, the fact 
that a donor favours a particular recipient because it is a former colony is irrelevant here. What 
matters is the variation in aid from one period to the next, and not the exact quantity allocated 
each year.  
 
Recently Frey et al. (2007) have shown that this approach may actually fail to measure 
herding properly. They develop a simple structural model to match the use and interpretation of 
LSVit and find in simulations that the measure underestimates the true herding parameter. The 
adjustment factor overcorrects the estimated parameter unless there are a very high number of 
observations per recipient year. Unfortunately this is not the case in aid where the number of 
donors never exceeds 53 in our data. Frey et al. (2007) propose an alternative measure Hit not 








nit is the number of donors giving aid to recipient i in year t. Hit is then averaged over recipient-







ℎ =  𝐻 
h is a consistent estimator of their herding parameter. Using Monte Carlo simulations they find 
that LSV is a good statistic to test for the presence of herding: if LSV is significantly different 
from zero, then there is herding. However LSV does a poor job at estimating the size of herding. 
H is also a viable statistic to test the presence of herding and h provides an accurate estimate of 
herding. In particular it improves significantly with the number of recipient-years, while LSV 
does  not.  Since  our  sample  contains  at  most  5171  observations  h  is  expected  to  perform 10 
 
particularly well. Frey et al. therefore suggest a two step approach: first, test the existence of herd 
behaviour  using  either  LSV  or  H;  second  if  significant  herding  is  found,  estimate  its  level 
consistently using h.  
 
Our  approach  follows  their  suggestion.  For  each  set  of  recipient-years  where  herding  is 
measured, LSV is reported. If the hypothesis of no herding is rejected then h is calculated to 
estimate its size. This approach is not flawless though. It was mentioned above that unlike LSV, h 
relies  on  a  structural  model.  It  is  simple  and  quite  general  but  it  may  not  be  suited  to  aid 
allocation or may miss some important characteristics. In that case h may not be a good measure. 
 
b) Which recipient-years? Which donors? 
 
The OECD DAC dataset contains 5837 recipient-years where at least one donor is active.
3 
Aid activities of 60 donors are reported, though no more than 53 are ever present simultaneously. 
Herding measures can theoretically be based on all these observations. However there are good 
reasons to restrict the set of donors and recipients.  
 
Donors enter and exit the aid market. Some donors did not give any aid before a partic ular 
year (Greece, New Zealand, Spain, etc.) but some also stopped after a particular year or stopped 
reporting their activities to the DAC. The fact that a new donor can only  increase  its  aid 
allocations is not necessarily an issue because the first year a donor is present is by construction 
not used in the herding measure. Only second year allocations onwards are valid for our purpose 
since to define aid increases and decreases in year t we need allocations in year t-1. On the other 
hand a donor that exits can only decrease its allocations. It may do so gradually over time if it has 
planned to cease its activity. Its behaviour is biased and may hide or exaggerate herding. We 
consequently compute our herding measure excluding donors that cease their activity. To be on 
the safe side we additionally estimate herding using a constant set of donors, made of developed 
countries that have been disbursing aid from 1960 to 2007, the full span of the data. Any donor 
that enters later or stops its activity earlier is excluded. These two restrictions are quite strong 
because they limit the number of observations and disregard some potentially useful data. 
 
A similar issue arises with recipients. Some countries do not “exist” before a certain date. 
That  mainly  concerns  ex-Soviet  Republics  and  regions  of  former  Yugoslavia.  There  was 
beneficial herding towards these countries. Their geographic proximity to many important donors 
                                                 
3 A donor is defined as active in recipient i in year t if it changes its allocation to recipient i from year t-1 to year t.  11 
 
and their needs created an influx of aid.
4 This type of herding is conspicuous and it is large. I t 
inflates any herding measure. Because we do not want our results to rely on these few particular 
cases we simply exclude them. Other entries are due to late additions to the OECD DAC recipient 
list. Aid to China has been recorded only from 1979, and only from 1975 for Mongolia. Whether 
none was given before or whether it was not reported is unclear. These are also excluded from the 
set of recipient-years. Any developing country that is not in the dataset in 1960, because it did not 
exist at that time, or  was not on the DAC list of recipients, is not taken into account when 
computing herding measures. This choice is also quite restrictive as it leaves aside observations 
where there may be herding.  
 
An intermediate restriction is also applied.  Recipients and donors  entering after 1960 are 
included but their first five years of presence are not. It leaves some time for donors to scale aid 
up to new countries and reach a stabilised regime. It also allows donors to increase their 
allocations in their first years of presence without this affecting the herding measures.  
 
Finally both LSVit and Hit can be computed as soon as one donor is active in the recipient-
year. Yet to talk about herding when there is only one donor does not make much sense. There 
must be a herd to follow in order to have herd behaviour. Recipient-years with fewer than five 
active donors are not considered.  
 
To sum up, donors that stop their activity are never included, those that enter after 1960 are 
not included, or only after their first five years. Countries whose receipts were not recorded in 
1960 are excluded, or are included only after their first five years. Recipient-years with fewer 
than five active donors are always excluded. That leaves us with a dataset that contains at most 
5171 recipient-years.  
 
LSVit and Hit are computed for different groups of donors. Activities either from all donors are 
considered, or only from DAC donors, or only from multilateral donors. Indeed one might think 
that bilateral donors herd but that multilateral donors take independent decisions. In that case the 
latter are merely adding some noise that makes herding more difficult to detect.  
 
 
                                                 
4 It is debatable whether there was herding given their characteristics: other countries under similar conditions might 
not have enjoyed similar attention.  12 
 
IV.  Results 
 
Table 1 presents herding measures for different groups of donors. Herding is significant in all 
groups, regardless of the restrictions imposed, except among multilateral donors. Those do not 
herd.
5 DAC donors on the other hand, do.  LSV is always significant at the 1 per cent level. 
Having passed the existence test, h is computed to find herding levels.  
 
Both  LSV  and  h  have  the  same  interpretation.  Paraphrasing  Lakonishok  et  al.  (1992),  a 
measure of x implies that if π, the average fraction of changes that are increases, was 0.5, then 
50+x  percent  of  the  donors  were  changing  their  allocations  to  an  average  recipient  in  one 
direction and 50-x percent in the opposite direction. As emphasised by Frey et al. (2007) LSV 
underestimates herding and is always much smaller than h. According to the LSV measure, there 
is statistically significant herding but not economically. Only about 1 per cent of the changes can 
be attributed to herding. In other words only 1 per cent of the changes in an average recipient-
year cannot happen by chance and so constitute herding. The adjustment factor overcorrects LSV 
to the point that it cannot distinguish between randomness and herding. h does not suffer from the 
same bias. Its size implies that if the average fraction of changes that are increases is 0.5, on 
average around 56% of donors take similar decisions in a recipient-year.  
 
Herding on financial markets using the LSV measure is usually higher. Lakonishok et al. 
(1992) find a value of 2.7, Wermers (1999) of 3.40. Herding in aid allocation would be roughly a 











                                                 
5 It must be clear that multilaterals do not herd among themselves. It does not imply that some of them do not herd 
with bilateral donors. 13 
 
Table 1: LSV and h measures 




  Multilateral 
donors 
    LSV  h    LSV  H    LSV  h 
Donors present until 2007, recipients present 
since 1960   
1.07 
(5171) 
6.27    1.05 
(4866) 
6.53    0.43 
(3998) 
4.36 
Donors present 1960-2007, recipients present 
since 1960   
1.07 
(4788) 
6.65    1.08 
(4640) 
7.08    n.a  . 




6.03    1.11 
(4865) 
6.61    0.45 
(3803) 
4.64 
Source: Authors, 2009; based on OECD data, 2009. 
 
V.  Alternative measures 
 
The two previous measures rely on the idea of dispersion relative to an average behaviour in 
aid allocation. The benchmark is the same for all countries in a given year. It is a cross country 
reference,  implicitly  assuming  that  all  countries  are  expected  to  be  treated  similarly  in  the 
absence of herding.  
 
An alternative is to use past changes within countries. The expected proportion of increases in 
recipient i in year t would not be the proportion of increases in that year but instead the average 
proportion of increases  in  i  from  year t-5 to  year t-1. The 5  year window is  arbitrary. This 
measure does not assume equal treatment across countries but rather that under the assumption of 
no herding today’s proportion of increases is expected to be close to what occurred in the last five 
years. The two measures are complementary as they are based on two different conceptions of 
herding. Like LSVit it should be made neutral to changes in the global trend in aid. A proportion 
of increases can be far from its moving average because of herding or because the general policy 
in the current year is to decrease (or increase) aid. In order to shield the measure against such 
variations, the variable of interest is not the proportion of increases but instead the difference 
between this proportion and the average proportion of increases in that year. The within measure 




?𝑖𝑡 =  𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 − 𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡             − 𝐸 𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 − 𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡             
where the upper bar designates the 5-year moving average. 
 






2 𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 − 𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡            2 − 𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑡      1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑡       − 𝑛𝑖𝑡
2(𝜋𝑡 − 𝑝𝑖𝑡     )2
𝑛𝑖𝑡 1 − 𝑛𝑖𝑡 
 
 
Hw and hw are then defined in a similar fashion to H and h. An example may serve to 
illustrate the difference between the two measures. Assume that the proportion of increases in 
year t is 0.5. 80 per cent of the donors active in a given recipient  i in  year t increase their 
allocations. LSVit interprets this deviation as herding. In the past five years the average proportion 
of  increases  for  recipient  i  has  been  0.75.  The  within  measure  does  not  see  any  significant 
difference between  year  t and the past  and returns  a non-significant  herding value. The two 
measures do not necessarily disagree though. Had the past proportion of increases been 0.5 then 
both measures would return the exact same herding level. 
 
Wit and Hit
w are computed for the same group of donors and recipients as LSVit and Hit. In 
order to be included a recipient-year and each of the past five years must have at least 5 active 
donors. If fewer than five years are available then the observation is discarded.  
 
Table 2: W and h
w measures 
   
All donors    DAC donors   
Multilateral 
donors 
    W  h
w    W  h
w    W  h
w 
Donors present until 2007, recipients present 
since 1960 
  1.45 
(4485) 
6.96    1.77 
(4162) 
8.42    0.65 
(3234) 
5.21 
Donors present 1960-2007, recipients present 
since 1960 
  1.90 
(4113) 
8.95    1.90 
(3933) 
9.31    n.a   
5 year presence threshold     1.57 
(4656) 
7.80    1.86 
(4370) 
8.86    0.69 
(3066) 
5.26 
Source: Authors, 2009; based on OECD data, 2009. 
 
Table 2 reports the results using the within measures. Herding is more pronounced when 
the benchmark is based on past allocations. h
w indicates values around 7-9 per cent. This means 15 
 
that  if  in  the  past  five  years  on  average  50  percent  of  all  active  donors  increased  their  aid 
allocations then in the current year 57-59 percent take a similar decision. Values for multilateral 
donors are still very small.  
 
LSV uses yearly data to detect herding. It makes sense because donor disbursements are 
allocated on a yearly basis and these are expected to be influenced by herding. On the other hand, 
donors, unlike traders, commit to future disbursements over several years. Many projects have a 
longer horizon than a year. Even if they herd, donors might find it difficult to stop programs 
currently running and shifts in allocation may take some years before taking effect. Year-on-year 
changes  may  fail  to  capture  such  movements  and  on  the  contrary  be  oversensitive  to  small 
variations that do not reflect herding but rather marginal changes due to project progression. 
Indeed many aid changes are quite small: the median absolute change for all donors is USD 0.80 
million but the average is 8.53 million. The distribution of changes is strongly skewed towards 
small values.  It is  difficult to  argue that  such  small variations  always reflect  donor  choices. 
However LSV (or h) treat changes regardless of their sizes. It could be argued that these limited 
variations inflate herding measures  artificially by putting some weight  on random variations. 
These also create noise in the data that makes herding more difficult to detect.  
 
Two solutions are proposed to address this issue. First “small” changes are not taken into 
account. More precisely, focusing on the most stable group of donors and recipients that includes 
only  donors  present  continuously  from  1960  to  2007  and  recipients  present  since  1960, 
25 per cent of all changes are smaller than USD 0.24 million (the median is 1.52, the average 
11.99). If a donor changes its allocation by less than USD 0.24 million in absolute terms then it is 
not used to compute the two herding measures. However, the requirement that at least 5 valid 
donors must be active in a recipient year is not changed. Since a valid donor must change its 
disbursement by at least 0.24 million this condition is stronger. Second random variations are 
smoothed away by using 3-year periods. Instead of using year-on-year changes, disbursements 
are added up over a period of three years and a donor is said to increase its aid to a recipient 
between two periods if its disbursements over three years are higher than over the three precedent 
years (here again a period is valid only if the donor disbursed aid during each of the three years of 
the period). Collapsing the data in such a way drastically reduces the number of observations but 
increases  the median size of an absolute change from  1.52 to  4.87 million. Lengthening the 
period takes into account the medium term perspective of development aid. The exact length is 
arbitrary, and results using 5-year periods are also presented. 
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Table 3: LSV and h measures excluding small changes and with 3 and 5-year periods. 
    Small changes 
excluded 
  3-year periods    5-year 
periods 
    LSV  h    LSV  h    LSV  h 
Donors  present  until  2007,  recipients 
present since 1960 
  1.32 
(4573) 
7.21    3.37 
(1670) 
11.20    4.44 
(974) 
12.92 
Donors  present  1960-2007,  recipients 
present since 1960 
  1.14 
(4056) 
7.26    3.37 
(1582) 
11.98    4.25 
(935) 
13.61 
Source: Authors, 2009; based on OECD data, 2009. 
 
The first two columns of Table 3 indicate that the exclusion of small changes does not 
have a big impact on herding size. It is only slightly higher, suggesting that small variations tend 
to compensate each other on average. The next two columns use three-year periods to detect 
herding. Its presence is confirmed and its size is above what has been found in Table 1. For the 
same donor and recipient category, h measured on yearly data yielded a value of 6.27. 3-year data 
reveal a herding level of 11.20. 5-year data provide a similar and even stronger conclusion. If one 
prefers to use the LSV measure for both detection and size to avoid relying on any structural 
model, then results are even stronger with size multiplied by three. Magnitudes are now similar to 
those observed on financial markets. If we are willing to adopt a slightly longer term perspective, 
herding appears to be more pronounced. Given the way aid is disbursed with commitments and 
tranche  disbursements  as  projects  progress,  this  perspective  seems  well  suited  and  avoids 
building measures on often small yearly variations. 
 
Table 3 confirms that there is significant herding in aid allocation and that its size is 
actually more important than what is derived from yearly data. Longer periods yield levels above 
or similar to what has been measured on financial markets with quarterly data. A high frequency 
makes sense in finance where investors are quick to respond and modify their portfolio choices, 
but much less in development. It is difficult to identify the optimal time span, but a few years are 
likely to match allocation policies’ time frame.  
 
The different measures we have used all point in the same direction. Herding in aid allocation 
is  present.  However  its  exact  size  depends  on  how  we  think  it  should  be  evaluated.  Yearly 
allocations in a pure cross country framework return a limited size. Within measures improve on 
the cross country ones by having the advantage of taking into account country fixed effects. 
Within herding is somewhat higher. Finally, year-on-year changes might not reflect decisions but 
be contaminated by random variations. Longer periods reveal larger herding levels that have 17 
 
important  consequences for aid  recipients.  Using  all the different  approaches,  the measure  h 
estimates herding to be between 6 and 12 per cent.   
 
VI.  Geographical distribution of herding 
 
Even though we focus on the average level of herding across developing countries, we show 
here how herding differs across countries. The following map indicates herding levels in each 
country. Herding is computed using the LSV index with 3-year periods, donors present until 2007, 
and with more than 5 donors per recipient-period. Unlike the previous tables, we do not exclude 
developing  countries  that  entered  later  than  1960,  since  the  point  here  is  to  provide  as 
comprehensive a picture as possible. Interval bounds are chosen such that each category includes 




Figure 2: LSV herding, 3-year data 




VII.  Herding determinants 
 
Which factors cause donors to act similarly? By subtracting debt relief, humanitarian and 
food aid from official development assistance, some of them have already been excluded from 
our analysis. Others are expected to influence donors in a similar fashion: political transitions that 
promote or jeopardise democracy, armed conflicts, income shocks, etc. These are determinants 
we can take into account but must leave aside more subtle ones related to strategic behaviour or 
informational cascades that are more difficult to identify. This section quantifies the effect of 
those observable shocks that create herding.  
 
As argued in Section II, such allocation changes can be regarded positively. Following a 
democratic  transition,  donors  may  all  respond  to  better  governance  and  more  transparent 
institutions with increased aid flows to further foster democracy. A more nuanced view would 
still caution against herding even in these situations. While it makes no doubt that these constitute 
valid reasons to increase aid, donors might still herd and overreact all together. Donors that do 
not participate in the aid splurge may fear being left out and missing some future investment or 
diplomatic opportunities. They may follow the crowd, increasing aid fragmentation in the country 
and inflating aid disbursements above the recipient country’s absorptive capacity. The border 
between legitimate, well planned aid increases (or decreases) and herding is usually difficult to 
delimit. This section does not attempt this difficult exercise but provides a first study of herding 
determinants.  
 
We also see this estimation as a valuable result in its own right. Beyond the issue of herding 
proper,  this  result  sheds  a  new  light  on  aid  allocation  to  what  has  been  done  in  the  past. 
Researchers  have  always  related  aid  quantities  to  recipients’  characteristics  (see  Alesina  and 
Dollar 2000, Alesina and Weder 2002,  Berthélemy 2006,  Berthélemy and Tichit  2004). The 
approach  taken  here  is  more  basic  as  it  considers  the  proportion  of  donors  increasing  aid, 
regardless of quantities. Donor decisions can be decomposed in two steps. First, they have to 
decide which recipients should receive more aid, and this is what is investigated here. Second, 
once where to increase and decrease aid is known, actual quantities are decided upon, and this is 
what the aid allocation literature has studied so far.  
 
The dependent variable in the estimations is pit. Because it is a proportion it only takes values 
between zero and one. OLS estimation is not well suited for this type of bounded dependent 
variable  because  predicted  values  cannot  be  ensured  to  lie  in  the  unit  interval.  Papke  and 
Wooldridge (1996) provide suitable estimators  based on quasi-maximum likelihood methods.  19 
 
They propose a method using a generalised linear model with a logit link, the binomial family 
and robust standard errors. More specifically, they assume that:  
E pit/xit  = G(xitβ) 
where  G(.)  is  the  logistic  function  and  xit  is  a  vector  of  explanatory  variables.  The  herding 
measures suggest a slightly different approach because the variable of interest is pit-πt, and not pit. 
To take the benchmark into account, however poses no difficulty. Instead of G being the logistic 
function 
1






exp⁡ (−xitβ). That is equivalent to changing 
the exposure of the dependent variable, or to have an offset ln 
πt
1−πt
 . The method developed by 
Papke and Wooldridge (1996) can readily be applied using this function G.  
 
Results following this estimation technique are complemented by more standard techniques 
using OLS with and without country fixed effects. These are not our preferred estimators due to 
the dependent variable being a proportion but we provide them as a further robustness check. 
Country fixed effects are added to remove any time-invariant unobserved characteristics that 
would affect herding (for instance Cuba may not fit our general model; a fixed effect removes its 




The dependent variable in the estimations is based on the 3-year period herding. Yearly data 
maximize the sample size but are very noisy. As argued before, they are based on many small 
allocation changes and are unlikely to correspond to donor time horizons, but results using yearly 
data are still presented as a robustness check. The 3-year herding measure is calculated for two 
samples: one only with donors present from 1960 to 2007, the other with all the donors that do 
not exit the market. Both only include recipients present from 1960. The first sample offers the 
advantage of a stable group with no entry, but misses some large donors and may fail to capture 
some herding. The 3-year measure also allows for some time before a new donor actually enters 
the data and so measures are unlikely to be contaminated by periods of portfolio increases. To use 
the maximum amount of information we prefer the second measure but we also present results 
using the stable set of donors. 
 
Independent  variables  are  constructed  from  four  different  categories:  economy,  politics, 
conflict, and natural disasters. Economic variables include GDP growth and GDP per capita, 
from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. Political variables are constructed 20 
 
from the Polity IV Project dataset. We exploit political transitions that result in more democratic 
or authoritarian regimes. A dummy variable is defined for each type of transition if it occurs in 
any of the three years of the period. Because of the 3-year structure of the data it is unclear that 
donors react during the same period. It might be the case when the transition is short and occurs 
at the beginning of the period, but not when the transition takes place in the last year of the 
period. To avoid missing such effects we create another dummy variable equal to 1 if there was a 
transition last period and not in the current period. We also use dummies for “new” countries, 
that is countries that gained independence
6 and for foreign interventions. Because 3-year periods 
are used, dummy variables take a value of 1 if the event occurred in any of the three years. GDP 
growth and GDP per capita are averages over the three years. 
 
The number of deaths in a country caused by natural disasters is provided by the  Emergency 
Events Database (EM-DAT). Figures for each year of the period under consideration are added to 
proxy for natural disaster intensity during the period. This number is then divided by the average 
population size in thousands during the period. The unit of measure is therefore the number of 
deaths due to a natural disaster by thousands of people. Aid in this paper does not include 
emergency aid but natural disasters are still expected to affect the number of aid increases for 
various reasons. First, humanitarian aid is not reported before 1995 in the data, and so enters our 
aid variable before that date. Second a natural disaster causes an influx of humanitarian  aid and 
more long term investments that do not necessarily enter into this category. It also attracts 
attention to the affected country and may trigger simultaneous aid flows from many donors. 
Armed conflict data comes from the  UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dat aset, as described in 
Gleditsch et al. (2002). The war dummy takes a value of 1 if there was a conflict in any of the 




The main empirical question is to estimate the effect of political, natural, and conflict shocks 
that cause similar allocation changes by donors. The first set of estimates uses 3-year data and is 
presented in Table 4. The first sample used includes all donors present until 2007. Column (1) 
uses the GLM estimator. Coefficients reported are marginal effects at the means to make them 
comparable with OLS estimates.  
 
 
                                                 
6 Countries that have not been present since 1960 are excluded from the data. Some countries gained independence 
later but aid flows had been recorded as early as 1960. 21 
 
Table 4: Herding determinants, 3-year data 
Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01. GLM estimation is done 
using a logit link and a binomial family. In columns (1) and (4) the dependent variable is pit and πt is included as an 
offset. Estimates are marginal effects estimated at the mean pit. For dummy variables the marginal effect is for discrete 
change from 0 to 1. In columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) the dependent variable is pit-πt. 
 
 
GDP per capita is significant but the size of the coefficient is extremely small given that 
income is measured in thousands of dollars. A transfer of USD 1000 per capita, arguably a very 
large change, reduces pit by 1.1 per cent. The inclusion of GDP per capita is not directly linked to 
any shock but rather controls for different treatments towards rich and poor countries. Growth, on 
  Donors present until 2007    Donors present 1960-2007 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
  GLM  OLS  FE    GLM  OLS  FE 
               
















               












               


















               













               












               












               


















               












               

















               












               












               
Observations  1377  1377  1377    1376  1376  1376 
Adjusted R
2    0.045  0.021      0.028  0.017 22 
 
the other hand, is not related to herding. The coefficient has the expected sign but is far from 
being significant.  
 
The variable “new polity” is very large and significant, implying that “new” countries receive 
aid from 20 per cent more donors than the average recipient. Political transitions offer interesting 
results. Democratic transitions do not trigger simultaneous positive responses from donors neither 
during nor afterwards. On the other hand donors do react to authoritarian transitions and reduce 
their allocations during transitions. The asymmetry between the two types of transitions is rather 
unexpected. We would expect donors to punish transitions towards authoritarianism but to reward 
those towards democracy. It is only mildly the case.   
 
Contrary to what Rodríguez and Santiso (2008) found for private bank flows, there is no 
democratic  premium  in  donor  herding  behaviour.  Donors  are  not  attracted  by  a  democratic 
transition, though they shy away from authoritarian transitions. This result is consistent with 
previous ones underlined by Easterly and Pfutze (2008) and Knack (2004) that found no evidence 
that aid rewards democracy. Kalyvitis and Vlachaki (2008) found an even more disturbing result 
and robust evidence that aid flows are negatively associated with the likelihood of observing a 
democratic regime in the recipient country.  
 
Natural disasters have a very significant effect. The number of deaths per 1000 persons due to 
natural  disasters  has  a  standard  deviation  of  0.46.  A  one-standard  deviation  from  the  mean 
increases the proportion of donors allocating more aid by 1.5 per cent. Finally, armed conflicts do 
not affect herding. Column (2) replicates the results using OLS. Estimates are surprisingly similar 
to those using GLM. Column (3) includes country fixed effects and confirms most results, with 
similar magnitudes. Once country time invariant characteristics are controlled for, GDP does not 
enter significantly in the regression. The significance levels of the GDP coefficient in column (1) 
was due to cross-section regression, and might have captured country fixed characteristics.  
 
Columns (4), (5), and (6) use the same specification but restrict the sample to the fixed set of 
donors present from 1960 to 2007. Results are very similar. The negative impact of authoritarian 
transitions is even larger than with the first specification. Though we think 3-year data constitutes 
a better and less volatile indicator of herding, we now present results using yearly data to check 
whether  only  aggregation  drives  the  findings.  Some  definitions  are  slightly  changed  to 
accommodate for the new frequency. The new polity dummy takes a value of 1 during the first 
three years of the new regime. This is to allow for a longer time span than the exact year the 
polity is created. Similarly, post transition dummies are equal to 1 in the two years following the 
last year of a transition, unless there is a transition in that specific year. 23 
 
Results do not depend on the exact time frame. 
 
Table 5: Herding determinants, yearly data 
  Donors present until 2007    Donors present 1960-2007 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (1)  (2)  (3) 
  GLM  OLS  FE    GLM  OLS  FE 
               
















               












               


















               


















               












               












               


















               















               



































Observations  3784  3784  3784    3784  3784  3784 
Adjusted R
2    0.032  0.027      0.022  0.020 
Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01. GLM estimation is done 
using a logit link and a binomial family. In columns (1) and (4) the dependent variable is pit and πt is included as an offset. 
Estimates are marginal effects estimated at the mean pit. For dummy variables the marginal effect is for discrete change from 
0 to 1. In columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) the dependent variable is pit-πt. 
Source: Authors, 2009. 
 
Table 5 essentially confirms the results from Table 4. Yearly data exhibit the same pattern, except 
for a less precisely estimated effect of natural disasters. Both tables show consistent results and 
make us confident that they are quite robust.  
 
Having identified herding determinants, we now evaluate to what extent they explain the results 
of Sections IV and V. 24 
 
VIII.  Corrected herding measure 
 
GLM estimation ensures that predicted values of pit are within the interval [0,1]. That allows 
us  to  compute  hypothetical  proportions  had  some  events  not  happened  and  compute  the 
“corrected herding measure” using the predicted proportions. OLS estimations usually provide 
predicted  values  smaller  than  0  or  larger  than  1  and  would  make  the  exercise  inconsistent. 
Consider a recipient year whose real proportion is pit and is characterised by the vector xit. We 
want to find the proportion had the characteristics been zit instead of xit. Using the definition of 
the function G, we obtain that : 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 ??????  =
𝑝𝑖𝑡 ?????? 




The  quantity  pit(zit)  can  be  calculated  by  using  the  estimate  value  of  beta  from  the 
regressions. pit(zit) is the proportion of donors that would have increased aid to recipient i in year t 
had its characteristics been zit instead of xit. The functional form adopted ensures, unlike a linear 
specification, that the number obtained can be interpreted as a proportion because it is between 0 
and 1.  
 
All the dummy variables are to be successively switched off to zero to see how much they 
account for herding. Natural disasters will also be assumed away. Once the new proportions are 
obtained, it is only a small step to obtain the corrected herding measures. The only remaining 
issue concerns the benchmark to be used for these new measures. The observed benchmark is 
affected by recipients’ characteristics. Changing these necessarily implies that the benchmark 
would have been different. To find the new benchmark we convert proportions in number of 
positive changes by multiplying them by the number of active donors in the recipient-year. That 
implicitly assumes that the number of donors would have been the same under the two sets of 
characteristics xit and zit. While this is not necessarily the case, this assumption provides a natural 
way to find the new benchmark proportion and should not greatly affect the results. The new 
benchmark is then computed using these hypothetical allocation changes and herding measures 
are calculated as in Section III.  
 
The sample and estimates using the 3-year period data with donors present until 2007 is 
used. Table 6 shows the effect of each variable on the herding measure. 
 25 
 
Table 6: Effects of each determinant on the 3-year herding measure 













LSV  3.37  3.35  3.35  3.35  3.30  3.26  3.24 
h  11.20  10.85  10.87  10.87  10.75  10.66  10.63 
Source: Authors, 2009. 
 
Starting from the original herding measure found in Table 3, each column removes the 
effect of a variable. For instance, deducting herding caused by new polities reduces h from 9.83 
to 9.76. Foreign intervention and democratic transition hardly change this result. Authoritarian 
transition and natural disasters have a larger effect. Conflicts also reduce herding but this should 
be taken with caution given that the regressions in Table 4 did not show any significant effect of 
conflicts. All the identified factors reduce h from 11.20 to 10.63, or LSV from 3.37 to 3.24. It is a 
modest fall (5 and 3 per cent respectively) and although some of these factors have been found to 
be significantly correlated with herding, they do not explain it well. In the absence of other easily 
identifiable factors a tentative conclusion is that the corrected herding levels reveal “irrational” 
herding due to some unobservable characteristics or strategic donor behaviour.  
 
Two extreme views are available to interpret Table 6. The deviations from the benchmark 
must be interpreted as herding and these events only serve as triggers, without any rationale. The 
other view is that these events cause “rational” deviations from the benchmark. They merely 
reflect  conditions  that  cause  similar  allocation  changes.  Donors  react  similarly  to  natural 
disasters, not because they herd but because they all agree natural disasters call for increased aid 
flows. The reality is likely to stand between these two extreme views. The former seems too 
strong as shocks are highly unlikely to be mere triggers that provoke aid surges for no good 
reason. On the other hand the latter may be too optimistic. As Section VI has already argued, 
even if donors follow motivations based on hard facts (natural disasters, political transitions, etc.) 
it does not prevent them from herding when these events occur. Their response is likely to be 
based on a mixture of herding and sound motivations. Exactly which share herding represents 





IX.  Conclusion 
 
This paper proposes different ways to measure herding in aid allocation. We chose to use two 
measures initially developed in finance and adapted them to the specifics of foreign aid. Our 
different estimates all reject the hypothesis of no herding.  
 
Its size however varies according to the measure used. Our preferred measure, using 3-year 
data and correcting for the bias inherent to the LSV measure, finds a herding level around 11 per 
cent. That implies that in a world where 50 per cent of all allocation changes are increases, the 
average recipient experiences 61 per cent of its donors changing their allocation in the same 
direction. In other words, half of the recipients see 61 per cent of their donors increase their 
allocations, and the other half sees 61 per cent decrease their aid allocations. The determinants of 
aid allocation, common to many donors, warn us against interpreting this quantity as “pure” 
herding, instead of similar responses to similar factors.  
 
We  therefore  moved  on  to  estimate  herding  determinants.  Shocks  are  expected  to  create 
swings in aid allocations and we primarily focused on these. Their influence has been shown to 
be relatively limited. It therefore remains that a large share of the measured herding cannot solely 
be explained by these shocks. We also see this estimation as a supplementary contribution of the 
paper, as previous research on aid allocation has mainly focused on aid quantities but not on 
increased  generosity  from  many  donors  simultaneously.  The  asymmetry  we  found  between 
democratic and authoritarian transitions is a novel result in the literature. 
 
Our strategy for measuring herding in aid allocation is a first step in an otherwise unexplored 
field. It is still unclear which measure would best suit our purpose. A structural model would 
clearly help but here again such models do not yet exist. The fact that all our indicators point in 
the same direction makes us  confident that herding is present in aid allocation. Finding that 
herding does not seem to occur for observable reasons leads us to believe that some unobserved 
motives are driving the results. This is what we would expect if donors did not herd “rationally” 
and followed what others did in an informational cascade fashion with no clear rationale.  
 
This paper suggests there is still a lot to learn about donor allocation policies. It also shows 
that beneficial herding is unlikely to explain herding levels, which might be worrisome in a world 
of globalised flows. Aid allocation decisions are not pro or counter-cyclical with respect to many 
variables (growth, democratic transitions and wars). It implies that large aid variations are not 27 
 
necessarily due to identifiable factors. Donor coordination would help to prevent such variations 
in cases where they stood to be harmful, and perhaps boost them when they were useful.  
This study leaves for future research the fundamental question of the motivations for donors 
to herd. It also leaves unanswered questions that we plan to investigate in the future. We have not 
investigated  herding  at  the  sector  level.  The  analysis  realised  at  the  country  level  could  be 
completed with a focus on sectors (education, infrastructure, water sanitation, etc.) in order to 
underline donor herding behaviour at that level and identify the shifting fashions that drive the 
aid industry, or, in another words, to identify both donor darling countries and donor darling 
sectors. We have not estimated the costs of herding. These could be evaluated in terms of higher 
volatility since the costs of volatility have already been estimated. They could also be related to 
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